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Given the importance of the philosophical movement known as Logical Empiricism, in past and present history 
of science of philosophy, nothing more necessary than being clear about its foundations. With this purpose, this 
article makes a systematic presentation of the central theses of Logical Empiricism, based on its programmatic 
documents. The presented theses are as follows: 1) The empiricist thesis, knowledge about nature is synthetic; 
2) The knowledge of logic and mathematics is analytic; 3) The verifying principle as demarcation criterion 
between science and metaphysics; 4) The logical analysis of language as a philosophical method; 5) The 
unification of empirical sciences; and 6) The structure of scientific theories.
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Introduction
The heading logic empiricism, (or also, logic 
positivism, neoempiricism, or neopositivism), of 
the philosophic perspective inaugurated by member 
of the Circle of Vienna, fairly shows the principles 
it is founded on: an empiricist vision (positivist) of 
knowledge (scientific), and the use of logic analysis 
method.  The first principle is epistemological, since 
it supposes a theory of scientific knowledge, and the 
second one is methodological, because it focuses 
philosophic work on logic analysis of language. 
In addition, logic empiricists will place these two 
principles to serve two very concrete objectives: 
rejection of metaphysics s in science, and unification 
of science.  Logic empiricists stated these aspects 
of their philosophy in the pragmatic document The 
scientific conception of the world: The Circle of 
Vienna, written by Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, and 
Ruldof Carnap in August, 1929, and dedicated to 
Moritz Schlick, around whom the group the group 
had consolidated. Where they say, for example: 
We have characterized the Scientific conception 
of the world in the fundamental through two 
traits. First, it is empiricist and positivist: there is 
a single knowledge of experience based on what 
is immediately given. Through this, demarcation 
of legitimate scientific content is established. 
Secondly, scientific conception of the world is 
distinguished through application  of a determined 
method, such as the one of logic analysis. (Hahn, 
Neurath and Carnap, 1929;115). 
And immediately afterwards they mention the second 
one of the two proposed objectives: “The hope of 
scientific work relies on achieving the objective of 
unified science, through application of that logic 
analysis to the empirical material”  (Hahn, Neurath 
and Carnap, 1929;115). 
As it may be seen,  the first thesis contains two sub-
theses, which I consider underline the subtle and basic 
distinction existing for logic empiricists between 
empiricism and positivism: the empiricist thesis is 
equal to the criterion of justification of knowledge 
on reality, “there is a single knowledge of experience 
and it is based on what is immediately given,” and 
the positivist thesis is the use of this same criterion 
as a demarcation criterion between science and 
metaphysics, “through this, demarcation of legitimate 
scientific content is established.”
Logic empiricists also characterized their 
philosophic perspective as a direct opposition to 
Kant epistemology, this is, as the rejection to a 
priori synthetic judgments; through their own words: 
“Precisely in a priori rejection to the possibility of 
synthetic knowledge consists the basic thesis of 
modern empiricism… it only recognizes statements 
from experience on all types of objects, and  analytical 
statements of logic and mathematics”  (Hahn, Neurath 
and Carnap, 1929;115).  In summary, we may state 
that the following six theses compose the philosophic 
answer by logic empiricists: 
1) The empiricist thesis: knowledge on nature is 
synthetic
2) Knowledge of logic and mathematics is analytical.
3) The verifying principles of the meaning as 
a demarcation criterion between science and 
metaphysics. 
4) The logic analysis of language as a philosophic 
method
5) Unification of empirical sciences
6) Structure of two levels of empirical theories. 
Now, this may not drive us to think logic empiricism 
as a monolithic philosophical movement, free from 
controversy, since, as we will see, some of these 
topics will be subject to different interpretations.   
Analytical /synthetic distinction
One of Kant virtues of epistemology is that it founds 
natural sciences and mathematics under the same 
principles; both of them are built a priori on the 
same base of synthetic judgments.   And this thesis is 
opposed by any empiricist perspective on knowledge 
of the reality.  This is why, logic empiricists assume 
as maxim “the negation of a priori knowledge;” 
¿What such pretentions are based on? They main 
argument they claim is related to revolutions surged 
in the second half of XIX Century, and in early XX 
Century in Mathematics, Logic and Physics. In 
Mathematics there is the case of appearance of non-
Euclidian Geometry in the middle XIX Century; in 
Logics, appearance of formal logic  or mathematical 
developed by Frege by the end of XIX Century; and in 
Physics,  statement of theories of special and general 
relativity by Einstein in 1905, and 1916, respectively; 
and quantum mechanics in 1925-1926. 
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Appearance of non-Euclidian geometries led, in 
a first place, to differentiate what pure geometry is 
(mathematical), from applied geometry (physical): 
the latter one inquires into the structure of physical 
space of the world, while the first one is an abstract, 
conceptual and logic construction, which has nothing 
to do with experience or reality. And this latter poses 
serious consequences for Kantian conception of 
mathematics founded on a priori basis, since if so, 
it would not be possible to build systems of pure 
geometries contradictory among themselves.  But 
the fact that non-Euclidian geometries may be built 
demonstrates otherwise, since the characteristic of 
these geometries, as shown by their name, is that 
at least one of their axioms denies any of Euclidian 
geometry axioms, therefore any non-Euclidian 
geometry results contradictory to the Euclidian 
one. Therefore, logic empiricists conclude that pure 
geometric knowledge (mathematic) is not a priori; 
and at not providing knowledge on the natural reality 
it may neither be a posteriori nor synthetic; therefore, 
it is analytical.
Old logic or classic held the predicative propositions 
as the unique base of analysis, which are of the form S 
is P, where predicate P attributes a property or attribute 
to the subject S, while the formal logic or mathematic, 
in addition works with the theory of relational 
propositions and the theory of variable propositional 
functions, and introduces, in addition, all of a 
symbolic formalism similar to the mathematics.   One 
of the important projects within this new logic, was 
conceiving mathematics as one of its branches, this is, 
it was expected to prove that all concepts and posture 
of mathematics could be derived, respectively, from 
basic concept or propositions of the logic.  Therefore, 
the nature of logic knowledge is similar to the one of 
mathematics, and, therefore, it is also analytical. 
Regarding the natural knowledge, in addition, the 
revolution initiated by non-Euclidian geometries was 
completed by Einstein’s theory of general relativity, 
a showing that the physical space is non-Euclidian, 
contrary to Newton’s proposal, and as thought by 
Kant. And, in a second place, Einstein’s theories and 
theories of quantum mechanics, are not only founded 
on principles contrary to what is proposed by Newton 
mechanics, but they have also been confirmed by a 
large number of experimentations. Such revolutions 
in physics would not be possible if mounted on 
synthetic principles a priori, which are apodictic, 
necessarily true. Therefore, logic empiricists conclude 
the principles of physics as in general, knowledge 
on the natural world, should be synthetic, should be 
justified on experience, and therefore, are related to 
this world.
In synthesis, the first theory of logic empiricism  is 
the empiricist idea, according to which, knowledge 
on natural sciences, (as the one of social studies), is 
synthetic, this is, “it is based on what is immediately 
given.”  While knowledge of formal sciences (logic 
and mathematics), is analytical. In other words, the 
various statements of ordinary language and scientific 
may be classified as analytical or as synthetic. Let´s 
see this in a more detail. 
Logic empiricists do not understand analyticity 
exactly as Kant does. For Kant, analyticity is related 
to the conceptual analysis, while for the first ones, it 
is related to meaning of the words; as Coffa claims: 
Kant’s disregard of non-psychological dimension of 
semantics could have led to mistake the analytical 
for the purely conceptual… Analysis of any concept 
does require the concept to be understood, but 
foundation of any qua analytical judgment content 
just requires its structure to be understood. (Coffa, 
1991:44). 
More precisely, for logic empiricists the truth or 
falseness of any analytical statement depends not 
only on its form or logic structure, and meaning of its 
terms; therefore, its truth or falseness is independent 
from the state of the world:  truths and analytical 
falseness say nothing about the real world. 
Therefore, there are analytical statements which 
depend only on their logic form, such as logic truths 
or tautologies1  and logic falseness or contradictions. 
The statement “all bachelor is a bachelor” is true 
for its manner and independence o of the content or 
meaning of its terms, since ‘bachelor’ may be changed 
for any other term, such as ‘dog’  without changing 
the value of the truth.  This is, the anterior statement 
is true because if possess the logic form or logic 
scheme ‘˅x, x = x’,   which is the principle of identity. 
The laws or third excluded, and no contraction of the 
logic are also tautologies. In synthesis, the value of 
the truth of tautologies and contradiction only depend 
on their logic form. 
1A term introduced by Ludwig Wittgenstein in the l Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus, 1922, see paragraph 4.46.
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But there are also true analytical statements which 
are not logic truths. For example, the statement 
‘all bachelor is non-married’ is true in virtue of the 
meaning of its terms and its logic form. This is, the 
statement is true because bachelor means the same as 
non-married and,  taking this latter into consideration, 
the original statement  has the logic form, too ‘˅x, 
x = x’. Mathematic truths  are also of this type and, 
therefore in a first instance, they  would not  belong to 
the logic; for example, ‘2+3 = 5’ is a statement which 
truth depends on the content, on meanings, of each 
side of the  equality, but not only on its form. Finally, 
the above examples lead to observe that an analytical 
truth does not say anything about the world, its truth is 
independent from what is given in the reality; in other 
words, an analytical truth is a necessary truth, it is 
truth under any conceivable circumstance, therefore 
its negation is impossible. 
In addition, synthetic statements say something of the 
real world, therefore, their truth of falseness depends 
on how reality is.  Also, what negation says of a 
synthetic statement is possible, it is not contradictory. 
Thus, the analytic / synthetic distinction is founded on 
the necessary / contingent distinction: true statements 
of formal sciences are all necessary, and those 
referring to this particular world are all contingent. 
All statements of empirical sciences, (physics, 
chemistry, biology, sociology, etc.,), are synthetic. 
For example, the principle of causality ‘all effect as 
a cause’, ‘all bodies are extensive’ and ‘all bodies are 
heavy’, are synthetic statements because they speak 
of this real world, and therefore, have to be justified 
parting from experience. Remember that for Kant 
the first statement is synthetic a priori, the second is 
analytical, and the third is synthetic. 
Verifying principle of the meaning: science 
and metaphysics 
 For logic empiricists there is a difference of nature 
between science (empirical sciences as the natural 
sciences, psychology, and social sciences) and 
metaphysics: Sciences have showed along their 
development that they really provide a true knowledge 
about reality (natural, psychical, and social), while 
metaphysics has characterized by proposing various 
systems of trans-phenomenal or transcendental 
reality to the nature that we see and experiment, 
which finally become inaccessible, incomparable 
and, in definitive, pure fiction.  And it is not only 
this, history of science has also witnessed pollution 
of sciences with metaphysical ideas, therefore, it is 
a task of philosophy not only to achieve a science 
free from metaphysics but also consolidate a posture 
fully anti-metaphysical.  When logic empiricists talk 
about metaphysics, they refer to the “metaphysics 
in the own sense, classic of the term, especially to 
scholastic metaphysics, and to the one of German 
idealism, but also to the hidden metaphysics of the 
Kantian and modern apriorism” (Hahn, Neurath and 
Carnap, 1929:114). 
Thus, logic empiricists consider that it is possible to 
distinguish between science and metaphysics through 
an empiricist criterion, and in terms of the statement 
meanings; therefore, they introduce the Verifying 
principle of the meaning (PVS) as the mechanism 
that leads to establish whether a statement is scientific 
or metaphysical.  In other words, the starting idea 
is that statements of science (excluding formal 
sciences, and analytical statements), are statements 
with a sense, because they say something on the 
reality, and those of metaphysic systems are senseless 
because they do not say anything on the world. Thus 
the PVS is the criterion to differentiate the scientific 
knowledge from the metaphysic one, that is, which 
makes sense from which does not. This principle is, 
in a first instance, semantic and non-epistemological; 
although, at inducing the semantic notion of meaning 
of a statement to the epistemological aspect of its 
verification, the epistemological is what prevails. 
The principle says, in its general form: a synthetic 
statement is significant just of in principle it may be 
verified in experience (this is, through what is given). 
But the principle in its extreme form identifies the 
meaning of a statement through its verification, 
(See Schilck, 1930-31-97), the sense or meaning of 
a statement (synthetic) is the method of empirical 
verification of the same. In Shilck’s words: “the 
meaning of a proposition undoubltedly consists in 
the fact that it expresses a define state of things. This 
defined state of things should be expressed to give 
sense of any proposition” (Schilick, 1930-31:93). In 
other words, a statement makes sense just if there is 
an empirical method to decide whether it is true of 
false; otherwise, if such method does not exist, such 
statement does not make sense.  Now, since the natural 
thing is to suppose that every statement is significant, 
then it is more appropriate to suppose that every 
statement is significant, then it is more appropriate to 
grade as pseudo-statements those expressions which 
do not pass the PVS test.  In definitive, a pseudo-
statement is an expression with appearance of a 
statement which lack of meaning or sense. 
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According to logic empiricists, the various statements 
of science comply with the PVS, while those of a 
metaphysical system do not; therefore, the latter result 
being senseless statements of pseudo-statements. 
In synthesis, it is worth to highlight the following 
kinds of statements: the logic truths, and non-logic 
analytical truths, which belong to formal sciences; 
synthetic truths of empirical sciences, and senseless 
statements (pseudo-statements) of metaphysical 
systems. 
Let’s see some details related to the PVS.  We should 
start by considering how logic empiricists understood 
what is given. Notwithstanding they agreed with the 
fundamental character of the given, since as Shilick 
claims: “What is given [is] an expression which 
designates the very elemental and therefore it is no 
longer doubted” (Schlick, 1930-31:90), at first they 
did not agree regarding what referred to the given; at 
least three versions were introduced. In one case, the 
given refers to the most sensible sensor qualifications, 
to sensations which are experienced, to sensible data 
or sensor impressions; for example when eating an 
apple, sensations such as  “red”, “round”, “sweet”, 
etc. In another case, and contrary to atomic sensor 
experiences of the previous case, what given is 
related to global sensible experiences (experiences), 
and similarity relationships among them. Thus, in the 
above example of the apple, the description would 
include everything related to what is experienced at 
eating the apple, which is not easy to describe. In 
the last case what given refers to objects as they are 
ordinarily understood, this is, it refers to physical 
objects space-temporally located. The description 
in the example would be something of this type: 
the apple which is red and round, tastes sweet to 
me. Logic empiricists finally agreed with this latter 
way of speaking, for physical language, since this 
language refers to objective public experiences, 
while the language of (atomic) sensations, and the 
language of (global experiences) experiences refer to 
individual experiences, which other persons may not 
access, therefore, this path lead to what is named as 
solipsism: the world I know is not a public world but 
the world I experiment, my world. 
Let’s see some examples expressed by Shilick 
himself in his article 1932-1933: ‘There is a 
3,000-meter high mountain on the hidden face of the 
Moon´ it is a statement which by then was verified, 
in fact,  but which notwithstanding could be verified 
in principle, therefore the statement is significant, 
although not known whether it is true or false. While 
if a Physicist states that the statement ‘The electron 
as a nucleus inside it’  without telling how such 
nucleus could be detected, either  indirectly through 
certain effects, then it could be concluded that the 
statement is senseless, does not make sense, there is 
no way to verify it, and therefore it is metaphysical. 
Finally, statements belonging to the proper kind of 
metaphysics.  The same form as metaphysics has 
been always understood excludes the possibility that 
its statements may be verified, since the metaphysics 
always goes beyond of what us given.  Concepts such 
as Thing in itself, which is supposed to be  behind 
phenomena we experience, and The absolute, which 
is behind the whole reality, are transcendent non direct 
or indirectly accessible to experience, therefore, they 
may not be verified; these concepts are senseless, 
they are metaphysical. 
But these examples and other, as we see below, 
evidence the difficulties faced by the PVS, this is, the 
pretention of identifying sense through verification. 
The case of the electron nucleus is similar in 
certain aspect to the metaphysical entities, since 
in both cases it is clear that we understand what is 
wanted to express; therefore we have to conclude 
that affirmations on the nucleus of electrons, thing 
in themselves and the absolute make sense, are 
significant, although it is really true that they are 
not susceptible of being verified. In definitive, it is 
not right to equal the significant to the verifiable, 
“although testability is certainly a sufficient condition 
for signification of propositions, is not necessary” 
(Mahner nd Bunge: 1997:77), since if any statement 
is verifiable is because it is significant. In other 
words, as Mahner and Bunge propose, it is necessary 
to turn PVS over: “the possession of meaning is 
necessary for testability” (Mahner y Bunge: 1997: 
77); in order to test a statement, it is necessary to start 
by understanding it, this is, the statement should be 
significant. 
A second type problem surges with scientific laws, 
for example, the physical ones. It is not possible 
to fully verify the law ‘All metals exposed to heat 
expand’; which is verified are particular cases; this or 
that metal dilates with heat. Here we are in front of 
the problem of induction stated by Hume: we may not 
explain the supposed need of the laws of nature. The 
conclusion is that the PVA attack directly the back 
bone of science, the laws of nature, which would a 
senseless at not being possible to be fully verified.  
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A third problem is related to theoretic statements of 
science, which includes theoretic laws and in general, 
is similar to the case of the electron nucleus. As we 
will explain in the heading the two-level model of 
language: writing of empirical theories,  the starting 
point of the two-level model of language, which 
dominated the interior of logic empiricism, which 
is the scientific knowledge, is characterized for not 
being restricted or limited  unique and exclusively 
to the scope of what is observed; since really, such 
knowledge goes beyond, at proposing a subjacent 
world which goes beyond this phenomenal  ambit 
of the observable, and postulating certain entities, 
with their respective properties, and relationships 
among them. The science, at postulating such 
subjacent world, introduces new concepts to refer to 
it, and, therefore, new terms. In this manner the logic 
empiricists introduced the observational /theoretic 
dichotomy, according to which, the scientific 
language is divided into an observational language 
and a theoretic language: the first ones refers to the 
directly observational, and the second one to the 
theoretic, to the non-observational. 
Newtonian mechanics allows a good illustration 
of the above. In one hand, this theory explains 
various phenomena related to movement of bodies 
on the earth, and celestial bodies. In the first case, 
movements such as body falling, the one of missiles, 
the tilted plane and the pendulous one; and, in the 
second case, movements as the Moon, the planets, 
and the Earth. In the other hand, we could state that 
this explanative power  of the theory, comes from 
introduction of new concepts, such as mass and 
force (think in particular, of gravity force), which 
are related among themselves, and to concepts 
already known, such as  acceleration, through such 
known laws  of movement and the law of universal 
gravitation.  The theoretic character (non-observable) 
of the force of gravity, lays on the fact that  it is not a 
force which acts by contact but at a distance, which 
is transmitted at a great velocity (seemingly infinite), 
and with no energy spending. Gravity is transmitted 
in the vacuum, it does not requires any means, and 
it is not possible to detect it directly but through the 
effects produced among sufficiently massive bodies. 
The difficulty surge here is how to explain the PVS to 
the terms of theoretic concepts and, as a consequence, 
to the principles or laws composed of these, since 
given its nature, it becomes clear that they cannot 
be directly verified in the experience, in such a 
manner that they would become non-significant and, 
therefore, the theoretic world which is one of the 
important pieces of modern science, would be 
matched to metaphysics. 
For the logic empiricists, it is clear that a theoretic 
statement could not be directly verified, although 
it could be directly verified by logically rebuilding 
it based on statements referring to the immediate 
experience. But to achieve such reconstruction, 
and given the language division into observational 
and theoretic, there should be mixed statements 
which link theoretic statements to the observational 
ones, for the first ones to be significant. The 
logic empiricists named  these statements mixed 
rules of correspondence, in such a manner that, 
in definitive, it was possible to verify, (in reality 
confirm, as seen below),  a theoretic statement 
through observational statements which it is related 
to.  Now, this verification may not be complete, 
since if so, it would imply that theoretic terms 
may be defined in observational terms, in such a 
manner that they would become observational, and 
therefore, superfluous; and, in addition, this would 
become contradictory to observational / theoretic 
dichotomy, which was the starting point. As it may 
be seen, the achieved situation is very similar to the 
one of the metals case, presented above. 
This is why the logic empiricists made a re-reading 
of the PVS, where made clear that principles of 
a theory of theoretic statements may not be fully 
verified through observational tests, but they 
are more or less either or not confirmed by such 
tests; disregarding in this manner the certainty of 
theoretic principles and, in their place, clinging to 
their hypothetic character (See Carnal 1963, pp 
57 and 59). This fact led to a flexibilization of the 
PVS, which the same logic positivists considered 
as a liberation from the logic empiricism.  The 
PVS was changed for the confirming principle of 
the meaning; now, it is required for the theoretic 
statement to be only confirmed at any degree, and 
not in whole, through its observational implications. 
Carnap, verly well expresses this change of mind, 
in comments he adds in 1957 to the re-edition of 
his writing The old and the new logic in 1930-31, 
in these words: 
A scientific proposition may not be determined 
simply as a true or false; it may just be confirmed 
more or less son the basis of given observations. 
Therefore, the old principle of verification stated 
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for the first time by Wittgenstein was substituted for 
the more elastic requisite of confirmability (Carnap, 
1930-31:151)2. 
Logic analysis of language and philosophy 
La tesis metodológica del análisis lógico del lenguaje 
de la ciencia trae asociada la importante idea de que 
no puede ser una pretensión de la filosofía elaborar 
sistemas teóricos (filosóficos); la filosofía es solo eso, 
análisis lógico del lenguaje de la ciencia. Cito aquí en 
extenso a Carnap:
[…] the new scientific method of philosphing, 
which may be briefly characterized by stating that 
it consists of the logic analysis of the propositions 
and concepts of the empirical science.  By so doing, 
the two most important traits which distinguish 
this method from the traditional philosophy have 
been noted.  The first characteristic trait consists in 
the fact that this philosophing is realized in a close 
contact with the empirical science, therefore, any 
philosophy is no longer considered as a dominion 
of knowledge  by own  right, equal or superior to 
empirical sciences.  The second characteristic trait 
shows what the philosophic work consists of, on the 
empirical science: it is explanation of propositions of 
the empirical science through a logic analysis. More 
specifically, in the breakdown of propositions in their 
parts (concepts), in a step by step reduction of the 
concepts into more fundamental concepts of and from 
propositions into more fundamental propositions. 
(Carnap, 1930-31:151). 
This conception of philosophy is directly derived 
from how logic empiricists assume science. Science 
is understood as a group of statements systematically 
arranged, where each statement of the system says 
something about natural, social or human psychis 
reality, either direct or indirectly. This is equal to 
say that science is significant, tells about the world; 
and, inversely, all expressions which may not be 
linked to reality in this manner will be a significant 
metaphysical statement. Therefore, if statements 
of philosophy were significant, they would belong 
to science; and, inversely, of not, they would 
belong to metaphysics. In conclusion, the unique 
respectable path left to philosophy is to clean science 
from metaphysical elements which introduce by 
contraband, clarify those scientific concepts which 
2. In the  Tractatus the principle appears enounced in many ways; 
here is one: “4.063 […] to be able to say   ‘p’ is true (or false), I 
have to had determined in what circumstances I call ‘p’ as true, and 
by so doing, I determine the meaning of the proposition.” 
are confusing or ambiguous (points which sometimes 
are ignored by scientists), unmask metaphysical 
systems which present as respectable by showing 
the vacuum of their statements, and being clear and 
accurate in everything which it proposes, contrary 
to the dark and the non-examinable.  In summary, 
according to Wittgenstein’s words: “Philosophy is 
not a doctrine but an activity” (TLP: 1992, 4.112): 
Philosophy is a clarifying activity, but not construction 
of theoretic systems of knowledge. There are no 
philosophic problems as such, what there are, are 
scientific problems where philosophy cooperates 
by seeking explanation and meaning.  This is very 
clear in the scientific conception of the world (1929): 
“Clarification of philosophic traditional problems lead 
us, in part, to unmask them as pseudo-problems and, 
in part, to transform them into empirical problems, 
and then submit them to judgment by the science of 
experience.  The task of the philosophic consists of 
this clarification of problems and statements, but not 
in proposing “philosophic”, own” statements (Hahn, 
Neurath and Carnap, 1929:112). 
Now, for logic empiricists, the best instrument 
of philosophy to perform this task of conceptual 
clarification and metaphysical asepsis, is the formal 
logic, which main promoter was Frege  by the end 
of XIX Century, and which consolidated by the 
early XX Century  through Russell, Whitehead and 
Wittgenstein’s works, mainly.  As it is natural, 
As natural, the logic analysis methods of language 
should be satisfactorily combined with application of 
empirical principles. This is, the exam of a particular 
problem should be guided by established empirical 
principles, in such a manner that their application is 
oriented by the logic analysis of involved concepts 
and arguments. 
In definitive, ¿what is understood by logic analysis 
of language? Previously to underline the emphasis 
on logic analysis, the first thing that logic empirical 
methodology shows is what is considered as the 
linguistic turn in philosophy: traditional problems 
and the new ones of philosophy should be approached 
in terms of the language; in this manner clearness 
and accuracy in the same are achieved; in summary, 
the true philosophic problems, if any, are problems 
of language. For example, in epistemology there is 
neither room for a psychologist perspective, that search 
for the origin of knowledge,  and how it is expressed 
in   thoughts, nor questions on applied knowledge, for 
example, the perspective that should be privileged,  is 
the study of knowledge but in terms of language in 
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which it is finally expressed. Secondly, the maximum 
methodological “logic analysis of language” may not 
be taken in the strict sense referring the pure logic, 
to jus formal questions,  but in a wide sense related 
to applied logic, which includes syntax, semantic 
and pragmatic dimensions of language, and theories 
stated  in a certain language. In addition, such analysis 
is accompanied by reconstruction, this is, many times 
it is important to make a logic reconstruction of the 
problem stated for a subsequent critic of the same 
through analysis. 
Along this article various presentation have been 
made, which serve as an illustration of the logic 
analysis method, and all of them are expressed in 
linguistic terms.  We begin by distinguishing the 
analytical statements from the synthetic ones; the the 
PVS was introduced, which is semantic, to exclude 
the metaphysical statements in any manner legitimate 
of knowledge, in particular of the science; and in the 
various cases examples were given. 
Unified science:  reductionism
We have made critics to some theses of logic 
empiricists, and many will be made, but we should 
recognize that they are loyal, consequent and coherent 
with their principles, and there is no doubt that the 
philosophic project of a unified science that they 
marked, complies with such principles. The project 
consists of: Uniting and harmonizing achievements 
of the various sciences through the collective work, 
privileging inter-subjective knowledge, search for a 
total system of concepts, under the same symbolism, 
and neutral language” (Hahn, Neurath, and Carnap, 
1929:112). Sciences that would be the subject of 
unification would be the natural sciences (physics, 
chemistry and biology), psychology, and social 
studies.  Notwithstanding we should recognize that 
at a first sight these sciences bear very different 
purposes of study (the nature, psychis, and social life, 
respectively), the unification project is realizable, 
since: at being sciences, it is possible to refer their 
various kinds of knowledge to what is directly 
given, which we directly experience; in all of them 
it is possible to implement the same method, the one 
of logic analysis of concepts and arguments; and, 
finally, also under the logic orientation, it is likewise 
desirable and possible to create a unique neutral 
language, with the same symbolism, which will lead 
to a clear communication among the various sciences, 
and, surely, a safe and agile progress in such fields. 
If we start by recognizing that what is given or direct 
experiences are described through the physicalist 
language which refers to objects and processes located 
in the space-time, then it is clear that according to 
the con behavioral psychology (which dominated 
the epoch), it is possible to translate the various 
psychological concepts, which are subjective, in 
terms of an individual’s behavior, which is expressed 
in terms of physicalist language proper of sciences 
of nature. Something similar could be possible 
with social sciences; its various concepts could be 
translated into the physicalist language of this field. 
Thus, the project of unified science is reductionist, but 
reductionism is not ontological but methodological, 
according to logic empiricists. There are no realist 
pretentions, since the purpose is not to reduce the 
entities of the world of the human psychis, and the 
social life to physical bodies and their relationships. 
The pretentions are methodological,  psychological 
concepts and sociological may be translated into 
physical concepts; and likewise, physical  concepts 
and sociological could be reduced to the psychological 
ones, since physical concepts may be expressed in 
terms of perceptive experiences of an individual, and 
the sociological ones, in a first instance are reducible 
to the physical ones. All what is sought is to rebuild 
the concepts from a field into terms of the other. 
But in the reality this project is not feasible, not even 
in methodological terms. The fact that a relationship 
among concepts is established, should not imply 
disappearance of any one of them.  This may be seen 
even in natural sciences. An example taken from 
Bunge (2007), according to the chemistry which 
Water = H2O, but fluidity and the ability to evaporate 
are properties of water, but not of the composing 
molecules. 
The two-level model of language: Structure 
of empirical theories
This heading integrates the various components 
of logic empiricists into a full image of scientific 
knowledge, of scientific theories and their structure. 
This image uses to be called inherited conception 
of scientific theories, taking into account the influx 
and dominion it held through the late 70s of the 
last Century. This image of sciences and theories is 
dominated by the observational /theoretic dichotomy 
of language, as we warned in the heading verifying 
principle of meaning: science and metaphysics. 
Likewise, it is worth to stress that logic empiricists 
were the first ones in developing and support the 
systematic theory, contained in a philosophic 
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proposal likewise systematic, which would answer to 
the question: what is a scientific theory, and what is 
its structure.  Such conception of scientific theories 
has is origin, mainly in Leibniz, Frege, Russell and 
Whitehead’s logicism, and in the formal axiomatic 
method of David Hilbert for mathematics. 
In a succinct and technical manner, and following the 
scheme of la figure 13, a theory is a group of statements 
deductive and axiomatically arranged, in the strict 
meaning. In other words, a scientific theory is an 
axiomatized formal calculation (or system), which 
axioms represent the fundamental laws (or principles) 
of the theory, which are partially interpreted through 
rules of correspondence (or interpretation or 
coordinated definitions) which relate theoretic terms 
to observation terms. This idea of theory was already 
clearly expressed inThe scientific conception of the 
world (1929), through which is systems of hypotheses 
and axioms.
A system of axioms fully free from all empirical 
implication may, at the beginning, be considered 
as a system of implicit definitions; through which 
the following is thought: the concepts appearing 
in the axioms are determined or, in a certain way, 
defined not for their content, but only for their 
mutual relationships through the axioms.  Such 
system of axioms acquires a meaning for the reality 
just through the addition of additional definitions, 
such as “coordinative definitions, through which it 
is established what objectives of the reality should 
be considered as members of the system of axioms 
(Hahn, Neurath, and Carnap, 1929:117 - 118).4
The formal system (axiomatic) corresponds to the 
net of upper part of the scheme. The knots of the net 
represent the primitive concepts, and the strings the 
postulates or axioms of the formal system, which is 
disinterpreted. The axioms are equal to the theory 
laws, but once they have an empirical interpretation. 
Immediately below the net the derived concepts 
are found. While the lower part of the scheme 
3The figure is an adaptation of the one appearing in Giere (1988), 
p 25; which in turn is a reproduction of 
  Feigl (1970).
4 Ten years later, Carnap (1939), expresses the same idea as 
follows: “We may first builds a calculation and later establish the 
desired interpretation y a way of semantic rules which contribute 
a physical theory as a system interpreted with a factual content” 
(P.124)
 
corresponds to the observational level of the theory, 
which is directly linked to the experience, with the 
world. There, we find the empirical concepts or 
observational, and the relationships among them 
represent empirical laws or inductive, or of low level, 
such as the law All metals expand with heat. The two 
levels, the formal and the observational, are connected 
through the mechanism of rules of correspondence, 
(coordinative definitions), which relate primitive 
concepts to empirical concepts.
 Items frente  a la figura en su orden vertical. 
POSTULATES Theoretic laws.  PRIMITIVE 
CONCEPTS. DEFINED CONCEPTS. Rules of 
correspondence. Empirical laws. EMPIRICAL 
CONCEPTS.  “FIELD” OF OBSERVATION 
(EXPERIENCE)  
Fig. 1. Representación empirista lógica de una teoría 
científica.
Postulates 
Theoretic laws
Primitive
 concepts
Defined 
concepts.
Rules of 
correspondence
Empirical  laws
Empirical 
concepts
“Field” of observation
 (experience) 
Thus, rules are mixed statements, theoretic-
observational, and it is through them, that the 
formal system acquires an empirical interpretation 
or meaning, in this manner turning into a theoretic 
system, or empirical theory. If these rules did not 
exist, there would not be empirical theory (or physical 
theory), just a mathematic theory or a logic system. 
In synthesis, an empirical theory is a formal system 
with an empirical interpretation, plus all statements 
derived from such theory. 
Two final remarks.  This model leads to clearly 
establish the distinction between empirical law 
and theoretic law; the first one is obtained through 
induction, and it is composed only by observable 
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concepts, while the second one is normally the 
result from a creative act of a scientist, and it is a 
relationship among theoretic concepts. Secondly, 
this approach of scientific theories is considered as 
syntactic because it emphasizes on theories as formal 
systems and, according to the logic, every formal 
system is associated to syntax of a formal language 
and, in addition, the derivability is a syntactic notion. 
Biyle’s law and its relationship to Newtonian 
mechanics leads us to very well illustrate the various 
elements of a theory from the logic empiricist 
perspective5. Boyle’s law is supposed to be 
empirical, it is an inductive generalization that relates 
observational concepts of pressure, temperature and 
volume of a gas, through the following equation: 
Pressure (P) = Temperature (T) /Volume (V).
In addition, it is understood that kinetic theory of gases 
is the one which truly describes internal behavior of 
gases, in turn accounting for Boyle’s law, which only 
describes observational behavior of gases. This is, the 
subjacent structure of gases described by theoretic 
laws of the theory of gases leads to describe observable 
phenomena governed by Boyle’s empirical law.  Now, 
kinetic theory of gases is, in essence, implementation 
of Newtonian mechanics in this particular dominion, 
since, according to this latter, gases are composed of 
molecules in motion which comply with the laws of 
Newtonian mechanics, the laws of inertia, motion 
(F=m .a), and action-reaction. 
Well, let’s see how the main elements of an empirical 
theory are presented here, this is, theoretic levels 
and observational, and the rules of correspondence. 
Volume, temperature and pressure are observational 
concepts, since they are easy obtained through 
observation, or through relatively simple 
measurements.  The concepts of force and mass are 
theoretic, they do not refer to directly observable 
entities, but they are accurately introduced in a 
first time by the theory; in this case by Newtonian 
mechanics.  Finally, we could state that the following 
relationships between observational concepts and 
theoretic concepts, that they are but approximated 
definitions of the first ones in terms of the second 
ones, act as rules of correspondence. 
(1) The volume of a gas is directly related, basically, to 
the number of molecules of the gas and its respective 
mas
5 This illustration is also used by Sellars (1963), although not in 
the same manner. 
(2)The temperature of a gas is equal to the kinetic 
energy (mass and velocity), average of molecules of 
the gas.
(3) The pressure of a gas is equal to the average shock 
(F) of the molecules against the walls of its container. 
The above leads to observe, in addition, how kinetic 
theory explains macroscopic behavior of gases; in 
other words, how Boyle’s law is deducted parting 
from Newton’s laws.  Finally, from this perspective, 
Newton’s mechanics is basically equal to the three 
laws of movement with the law of gravity, plus all of 
the other statements, logically deducted from those 
laws. 
To end, it is worth to underline some virtues and 
deficiencies of the philosophic program of logic 
empiricists that will become obvious in any manner, 
during the fifty years following their statement. 
There is no room for doubt, that the various theses 
by logic empiricists take pride in their requirement of 
principle regarding clarity and precision; in addition, 
they assign a character of professional to philosophy 
of science by defining old philosophic and scientific 
problems, by stating implicit problems, by presenting 
other new ones, and implement the method of 
language logic analysis; everything within this new 
framework of systematic philosophy of science. 
Definitively, it is worth to recognize that they were 
loyal, consequent, and coherent with their principles. 
But, paradoxically, many of their theses and methods 
will be strongly criticized  due to their radicality and 
tightness.  Here are sme of these limitations. 1) The 
empiricism it defended, which, does not represent 
philosophy proper of modern science and current: 
while the latter has evidenced how observable 
phenomena transcend, empiricism assume them as 
an unsurmountable limit. 2) excessive emphasis on 
language, on analysis of language, since it sacrifices 
the study of science itself; interest does not fall in 
problems surged inside particular sciences, but in 
questions exclusively related to the scientific language. 
3)  It almost fully ignores, (not to say completely), 
the role of experimentation in scientific knowledge, 
since this is completely reduced to direct observation6 
and, therefore, the unique function performed by 
experimentations (as well as observation)  is the one 
of confirming of challenging theories. 
6. As Weber (2005) says, for logic empiricists: “Such distinction 
does not have a systematic  importance for epistemology” (p.129). 
Translation by the author. 
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